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ABSTRACT 
This paper adds three dimensions to the received literature: it models migration when the 
individuals’ preferences regarding their relative income are ordinal, it works out the 
resulting spatial steady-state distribution of the individuals, and it shows that the 
aggregate of the individuals’ migration choices in the spatial steady-state distribution 
sums up to the social optimum. This finding does not apply when the individuals’ 
preferences regarding their relative income are cardinal. We highlight the importance of 
the assumption about the nature of the individuals’ social preferences (whether ordinal or 
cardinal) to studying and predicting their migration behavior, and to elucidating the 
consequences of that behavior for social welfare. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
By now there is widespread recognition that comparisons with others impinge 
significantly on wellbeing and elicit substantial behavioral responses. In general, people 
would rather have a high income than a low income, and a high income-conferred rank 
than a low income-conferred rank. The incorporation of a dimension of relative income 
implies that income is valued in relation to the incomes of others with whom people 
naturally compare themselves (the “reference group” or the “comparison group”). In this 
paper, the preference for high rank-conferred income is expressed as distaste for low rank 
in the income hierarchy. Engaging in interpersonal comparisons affects the individuals’ 
sense of wellbeing and influences their behavior, including in relation to migration. We 
present a first brush attempt to model the migration of an individual as a rank-seeking 
strategy when the individual’s rank deprivation is measured as the distance from the top 
rank.  
Evidence from econometric studies, experimental economics, social psychology, 
and neuroscience indicates that humans routinely engage in interpersonal comparisons, 
and that the outcome of that engagement affects their sense of wellbeing. People are 
discontented when their consumption, income or social standing falls below that of those 
who constitute their “comparison group”. Examples of studies that recognize such 
discontent include Stark and Taylor (1991), Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Luttmer (2005), 
Fliessbach et al. (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald (2008), Takahashi et al. (2009), Fan 
and Stark (2011), Stark and Fan (2011), Stark and Hyll (2011), Card et al. (2012), and 
Stark et al. (2012). Stark (2013) presents corroborative evidence from physiology. The 
overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the notion of a strong asymmetry: the 
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comparisons that affect an individual’s sense of wellbeing significantly are the ones 
rendered by looking “up” the hierarchy, whereas looking “down” does not appear to be of 
much consequence or to deliver satisfaction. (For example, Andolfatto (2002) 
demonstrates that individuals are adversely affected by the material wellbeing of others in 
their comparison group when this wellbeing is far enough below their own.) Cohn et al. 
(2014) find that in choosing their level of work effort, workers respond to increased 
relative deprivation but not to increased “relative satisfaction.” Frey and Stutzer (2002), 
Walker and Smith (2002), and Stark (2013) review a large body of evidence that lends 
support to the “upward comparison” view. In the analysis that follows, the interpersonal 
comparisons are of income-based rank, and low status is conceptualized as low rank.  
The idea that rank-seeking is an important motive for human behavior is not a 
novelty of this paper. A study of the relationship between pay and wellbeing by Brown et 
al. (2008) reveals that the wage rank of workers influences significantly the satisfaction 
that they derive from their pay. Powdthavee (2009) finds that an individual’s position in 
the wealth hierarchy within his local community affects his perceived economic 
wellbeing more than comparing his income with the mean income of the community. 
Boyce et al. (2010) argue that individuals gain utility (general life satisfaction) mainly 
from the rank (or position) of their income within a comparison group rather than from 
their (absolute) income. In its February 27, 2016 issue, The Economist magazine reports 
the following finding of the Eurobarometer survey, which has tracked self-reported 
happiness for over four decades: “According to Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office, the 
only metric consistently correlated with European happiness is relative income. Moving 
one step up the income ladder increases happiness in every country in the EU.” 
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Indeed, writings both in economics and in sociology have long maintained that 
individuals have a strong preference for high (social) rank, and are stressed when they 
have low (social) rank. Smith has remarked that “the desire of … obtaining rank among 
our equals, is, perhaps, the strongest of all our desires” (Smith, 1759, Part VI, Section I, 
Paragraph 4). Veblen (1899) has shown that higher pay to others can depress one’s 
utility. Maslow (1943) views status as a basic human need, and Huberman et al. (2004, p. 
103) infer from a study of five societies that “subjects valued status independently of any 
monetary consequence.” There is considerable evidence from research in modern 
economics to the effect that the desire to escape low rank motivates workers to exert 
more effort (Neckermann and Frey, 2008; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2009; Duffy and 
Kornienko, 2010; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011), and students to perform better 
(Bandiera et al., 2009; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). 
The modern-day evidence nicely supports Smith’s assessment of the power of the 
incentive to escape low rank as distinct from the desire for the tangible benefits 
associated with high rank. We provide a base for correcting the disregard of the distaste 
for low ordinal rank as an explanatory variable of migration behavior and for testing 
further the role of the distaste for falling behind others in the income hierarchy in 
propelling migration.  
Admittedly, considerable empirical evidence finds that relative deprivation, which 
can be interpreted as a measure of low cardinal rank, is a statistically significant 
explanatory variable of migration behavior. Stark and Taylor (1991) show that relative 
deprivation increases the probability that household members will migrate from rural 
Mexico to the US to work. The significance of relative deprivation as an explanatory 
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variable of labor migration has received additional support in several more recent studies. 
Quinn (2006) reports that relative deprivation is a significant motivating factor in 
domestic migration decisions in Mexico. Stark et al. (2009) explore the relationship 
between aggregate relative poverty, which is functionally related to aggregate relative 
deprivation, and migration. Drawing on Polish regional data, they demonstrate that 
migration from a region is positively correlated with the aggregate relative deprivation in 
the region. Czaika (2011) finds that, in India, relative deprivation is an important factor in 
deciding whether a household member should migrate, especially over a short distance. 
Basarir (2012) observes that people in Indonesia are willing to bear a loss of absolute 
wealth if there is a relative wealth gain from migration. Jagger et al. (2012) report that 
relative deprivation is a significant explanatory variable of circular migration in Uganda. 
Vernazza (2013) concludes that, even though interstate migration in the US confers 
substantial increases in absolute income, the trigger for migration is relative deprivation 
(low relative income), not low absolute income. Drawing on data from the 2000 US 
census, Flippen (2013) shows that both blacks and whites who migrate from the North to 
the South generally have average lower absolute incomes than their stationary northern 
peers, yet enjoy significantly lower relative deprivation, and that the relative deprivation 
gains for blacks are substantially larger than those for whites. Hyll and Schneider (2014) 
use a data set collected in the German Democratic Republic in 1990 to show that aversion 
to relative deprivation increased the propensity to migrate to western Germany.  
Somewhat surprisingly, this body of work did not test for the role of distaste for 
low income rank as an alternative explanatory variable, nor did it study how the use of 
different measures of social preferences might affect the predictions of migration 
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outcomes and the corresponding social welfare consequences. After all, and as eloquently 
noted by Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008), models based on ordinal rank may predict very 
different behavior from models based on cardinal rank. As an illustration of the 
distinction between incentives to migrate under the two types of rank, consider the 
following example. Assume that a group consists of i and j, and that i is poorer than j. 
Then, under distaste for low cardinal rank, the migration incentive of i will be different 
when j’s income is 3 as opposed to when j’s income is 2. Under distaste for low income- 
based rank measured by position in the income hierarchy, however, the migration 
incentive of i will be the same because in both cases i is the second in the income 
hierarchy.  
If, contrary to the cardinality assumption of the received empirical inquiries, 
people are concerned about experiencing low ordinal rank and tailor their migration 
behavior in response to this concern, then the migration outcome is unlikely to replicate 
the migration outcome reached under the assumption that people are concerned about 
experiencing low cardinal rank. Holding incomes constant which, as explained below, 
enables us to concentrate on the “pure” migration response to experiencing low ordinal 
income rank, we study next both this response and its consequences for the spatial 
distribution of the population and for social welfare.  
An ordinal perspective has an empirically-related practical edge over a cardinal 
perspective. If a model assumes that people make migration decisions on the basis of 
income comparisons with others in their reference group, then it is presumed that they 
know / observe the incomes of others. This presumption can impose a heavy burden on 
the information structure. However, people can often rank themselves relatively easily in 
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the income distribution of their reference group (for example, by answering a question 
such as: “Am I richer than other members of my reference group?”). Thus, it is more 
likely that migration will be found to be explained by social preferences when these 
preferences are conceived to be ordinal. 
We characterize the steady-state distribution of a population of n individuals who 
are homogeneous in preferences and heterogeneous in incomes. The individuals who, to 
begin with, are in region A can migrate at no cost to themselves between region A and 
region B. We make three main assumptions: (1) that the individuals exhibit strong social 
preferences; (2) that their incomes are held constant; and (3) that the two regions are 
sufficiently similar. The reason for making assumption (1) is given in the preceding 
paragraphs. It co-implies that the reason for making assumption (2) is to allow us to 
concentrate on essentials, namely to facilitate a study of the pure effect on migration 
outcomes of location-specific dissatisfaction that arises from falling behind others in the 
income distribution. Social preferences take the form of distaste for occupying a rank that 
is lower than the rank of others in the income hierarchy of the individual’s reference 
group; in other words, social preferences represent the negative influence of unfavorable 
income comparisons on the individuals’ sense of wellbeing. A joint rationale for making 
assumptions (2) and (3) is as follows. We can think of the individuals as having 
exogenous levels of some skill, s, with income, I, being a function of such skill and the 
region, r and, thus, ( , )I s r . Assuming that the individuals’ skill is smoothly locationally 
transferable so that s does not change when r changes, and that the regions are similar in 
the sense that the function ( , )I s r  does not change (or changes only slightly) with respect 
to r between region A and region B or that the two regions are similarly developed in the 
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sense that changes in absolute income do not have a substantial effect on utility for a 
fixed relative income, enables us to concentrate on distaste for low rank in the income 
hierarchy as a motivation for migration. Because incomes are held constant, the 
wellbeing of an individual is solely a function of the extent to which the individual’s 
location aligns with his social preferences.1 
 
2. A BASELINE MODEL 
If people can migrate at no cost between two regions, and if their migration decisions are 
induced by rank considerations, what will the distribution of the population between the 
two regions look like? When individuals’ migration choices are driven by a desire to 
minimize their rank deprivation, will the aggregate of their migration moves sum up to a 
steady-state distribution of the population between the two regions? Will it lead to a 
spatial distribution that is optimal from a social welfare point of view?  
In order to respond to these questions, we begin with a simple representation. The 
population consists of 4n ≥  individuals (where n is a natural number) such that 
individual 1 has income 1x , individual 2 has income 2x , and so on, where 
1 2 ... nx x x< < < . At the outset, all the individuals are in region A. We let (empty) region 
B come into being or become accessible, such that migration between the two regions is 
possible, and is cost free. We assume that in all relevant respects the two regions are 
identical, so there is no reason arising from a difference in the regions’ amenities for the 
individuals to prefer one region to the other; improvement in rank is the sole reason for 
migration. When, in terms of the outcome of social comparisons, the regions are equally 
attractive (a tie), the individuals do not migrate. Once the individuals are in a region, the 
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region becomes instantaneously their exclusive sphere of comparison. However, the 
individuals can relocate as many times as they wish in response to the actual distribution 
of other individuals between the two regions. Put differently, the individuals base their 
migration decisions on the observed current state, without simultaneously forming 
expectations as to how other individuals will behave. For ease of exposition, we label the 
steps in the migration process as periods, with the initial period (when all the individuals 
are in region A) being referred to as zero:  
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FIGURE 1. The initial (period zero) distribution of the individuals. 
 
Claim 1: By period / 2n  if n is even, or by period ( 1) / 2n −  if n is odd, a steady-state 
distribution of the population will be reached. In the steady state, the population will be 
divided between the two regions evenly if n is even, or evenly but for one individual if n 
is odd.  
Proof: In period 1, individual n who does not have an incentive to migrate will stay in 
region A, whereas all the other individuals will move to region B in order to gain a higher 
rank.  
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Next, each of the individuals 3, 4,  ,  1n n− −  observes that he can obtain a 
higher rank (second) if he were to move back to region A. Thus, individuals 
3, 4,  ,  1n n− −  move to region A, and in period 2 the distribution of the individuals 
will be n in region A, 1n −  and 2n −  in region B, and the remainder of the population in 
region A. (Individual 2n −  will not move back to region A because of the assumption of 
no migration when there is a tie.)  
Once again, some individuals from region A, specifically 5, 6,  ,  1n n− − , will 
have an incentive to move to region B. We can see that by period / 2n  if n is even, or by 
period ( 1) / 2n −  if n is odd, all comings and goings will come to halt, and we will have 
the steady-state distribution of the population depicted in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2. The steady-state spatial distribution of the population under ordinal 
preferences. 
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What remains to be characterized is the location of the two lowest income 
individuals, namely the location of individuals 1 and 2. It turns out that the whereabouts 
of these two individuals depends on whether n is even or odd, and on whether when n is 
even, whether n or 2n −  is a multiple of 4, and when n is odd, whether 1n −  or 3n −  is a 
multiple of 4. Specifically, we have the following characterization. When n is even, then 
1 and 2 are in different regions: if n is a multiple of 4, then 1 is in region A, and 2 is in 
region B; if 2n −  is a multiple of 4, then 2 is in region A, and 1 is in region B. When n is 
odd, then 1 and 2 are in the same region: if 1n −  is a multiple of 4, then they are in region 
A; if 3n −  is a multiple of 4, then they are in region B.  
In conclusion, in the steady-state distribution of the population between region A 
and region B, the population is divided between the two regions evenly or evenly but for 
one individual. Q.E.D. 
 
3. ROBUSTNESS OF THE OUTCOME OF “AN EVEN OR AN EVEN BUT FOR ONE 
INDIVIDUAL” STEADY-STATE DISTRIBUTION TO A RELAXATION OF 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The results reported in the preceding section are not contingent on the assumption that all 
the individuals in region A who presume that their income rank will be higher in region B 
migrate to region B simultaneously. This assumption can be relaxed without jeopardizing 
the result of convergence to a steady-state outcome, and this relaxation does not affect the 
characterization of the steady-state distribution itself if the “migration corridor” is narrow 
in the sense that it allows only one individual to migrate per period, and the most “rank 
deprived” individual migrates first, the second most “rank deprived” migrates second, 
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and so on. A steady-state distribution will once again be reached with the population 
divided evenly or evenly but for one individual between the two regions, yet naturally, 
and differing from Section 2, reaching the steady state will take longer, with the number 
of periods depending on whether n is even or odd.  
Claim 2: Assume that only one individual can migrate per period, such that the most 
“rank deprived” individual migrates first. Then, a steady state will be reached with the 
population divided evenly or evenly but for one individual between the two regions. If n 
is even, it will take 2 / 4n  periods to reach the steady state, and if n is odd, it will take 
2( 1) / 4n −  periods.  
Proof: The number of periods needed to reach the steady state is the sum of the migration 
moves of the individuals. Obviously, individual n  never moves between region A and 
region B (so his contribution to the sum total of moves is zero). When they can, 
individual 1n −  and individual 2n −  move once from region A to region B and then they 
stay there. Individuals 3n −  and 4n −  move twice: as soon as they can, in the first time 
they move to region B and then, after the migration of individuals 1n −  and 2n −  to 
region B, as soon as it is possible for them, they move back to region A. Analogously, we 
can calculate that each individual 1, 2, ...,    1 k n= −  moves exactly 1
2
n k! − + #
! #$ %
 times 
where the operator x! "# $  denotes the biggest integer that is not greater than x. 
Consequently, the number of periods it takes to reach the steady state when n  is even is  
2
2 2
2 2 2
22 4 6 ( 2) ,
2 2 2
0 1 1 2 2 3
2 4
3 n n n
n n n n nn
− −
…+ + +
−
= +
+ + + + + + +
+ +…+ − + = ⋅ + =
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and when n  is odd, it is  
2
1 1
2 2
1 1 12 4
0 1 1 2
6 ( 1) .
2
2 3 3
2 4
n n
n n nn
− −
…+ +
+ − −
= + + +…+
+ + +
− ⋅ =
+ +
=
+ +
 
Q.E.D.  
Because we have assumed that 4n ≥ , then 
2
4 2
n n
>  and 
2 1 1
4 2
n n− −
> , so the time 
it takes to reach the steady state is indeed longer under a narrow “migration corridor” 
than under no constraint on the “width” of the “migration corridor.” 
As another generalization, we consider an income distribution in which several 
individuals have the same income. In this case, all the individuals who have the same 
income occupy the same rank, and all the individuals who occupy a given rank behave 
identically. Then, the results obtained in Section 2 do not depend on the constellation of 
having one individual of each income. (As in the baseline model, there are no constraints 
on the “width” of the “migration corridor.”) 
Claim 3: Let there be l individuals of each income, where l is a natural number other than 
zero. Population size is then n l⋅ . Akin to Section 2, a steady-state spatial distribution will 
be reached such that the population will be distributed between the two regions equally if 
n is even, or equally but l if n is odd.  
Proof: The proof follows straightforwardly upon multiplication of the number of 
occurrences of each income value in the income hierarchy by l. Then, l individuals with 
income n will stay in region A, l individuals with income 1n −  and l individuals with 
income 2n −  will migrate to and stay in region B, and so on. Q.E.D. 
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The assumption that the individuals base their migration decisions on the 
observed current state without forming expectations as to how other individuals will 
behave simultaneously can also be relaxed. Then, in just one period, a steady-state 
distribution of the population between region A and region B will be reached such that 
half or half but for one of the members of the population will be in each of the two 
regions. (Once again we make the assumptions of the baseline model and refer to a 
population consisting of n individuals.) We thus have the following claim. 
Claim 4: If the individuals are rational and far-sighted, they will be distributed equally or 
equally but for one individual between the two regions, and this distribution will be 
reached in just one period.  
Proof: Individual n (the richest individual) will stay in region A. Individual 1n −  will 
move to region B and stay there. Knowing that, individual 2n −  will stay in region A. By 
the same logic, aware of the location choices of individuals n, 1n − , and 2n − , individual 
3n −  will move to region B and stay there, and so on. Q.E.D.  
Relaxation of the assumption that migration is cost-free need not interfere with 
the result reported in Claim 4.  
As a constellation of a strictly positive cost of migration when the individuals are 
assumed to be rational and far-sighted, we assume that each migration move requires a 
cost 10 c x< < , and that this cost is the same for everyone. (Additional assumptions 
concerning c follow.) An individual will migrate if the value of the rank improvement 
that he will obtain upon migration is higher than the cost of migration. We assume that 
the individual’s valuation of the rank improvement is equal to the rank gain itself, namely 
that the value of the gain of one rank is 1, the value of the gain of two ranks is 2, and so 
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on. Thus, and as an example, if migration confers a gain of two ranks, and if the cost of 
migration is less than 2, then migration will be undertaken. 
Given the assumptions in the preceding paragraph, individual n will stay in region 
A. Individual 1n −  has the second rank in region A, and will have the first rank upon 
moving to region B; he will gain an improvement of one rank if he decides to migrate to 
region B. If 1c < , this individual will migrate, and if 1c > , this individual will stay in A. 
Thus, if 1c <  (individual n is in region A, individual 1n −  is in region B), the rank of 
individual 2n −  cannot be improved upon migration; in both regions he will have the 
second rank. Therefore, if 1c < , individual 2n −  will stay in region A. If 1c >  
(individuals n and 1n −  are in region A), then by moving to region B individual 2n −  can 
improve his rank - from the third in region A to the first in region B (a rank improvement 
of two). If 1 2c< < , this individual will migrate, and if 2c > , this individual will stay in 
A. We next consider the migration choice of individual 3n − . If 1c <  (individuals n and 
2n −  are in region A, individual 1n −  is in region B), individual 3n −  can improve his 
rank by moving to region B - from the third in region A to the second in region B. Given 
that 1c < , this individual will migrate. If 1 2c< <  (individuals n and 1n −  are in region 
A, individual 2n −  is in region B), individual 3n −  can improve his rank upon migration 
- from the third in region A to the second in region B. However, given that the cost of 
migration is higher than the value of the rank improvement ( 1c > ), this individual will 
not migrate. If 2c >  (individuals n, 1n − , and 2n −  are in region A), individual 3n −  
can improve his rank upon migration - from the fourth in region A to the first in region B. 
Thus, if 2 3c< < , this individual will migrate, whereas if 3c > , this individual will stay 
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in region A. The migration choice of individual 4n −  again depends on the magnitude of 
the cost of migration: 
for 1c <  (individuals n and 2n −  are in region A; individuals 1n −  and 3n −  are in 
region B), individual 4n −  cannot improve his rank by migration and, thus, he will stay 
in region A; 
for 1 2c< <  (individuals n, 1n − , and 3n −  are in region A; individual 2n −  is in region 
B), individual 4n −  can improve his rank by migration - from the fourth in region A to 
the second in region B. Because 2c < , which implies that the cost of migration is smaller 
than the value of the rank improvement, this individual will migrate; 
for 2 3c< <  (individuals n, 1n − , and 2n −  are in region A; individual 3n −  is in region 
B), individual 4n −  can improve his rank by migration - from the fourth in region A to 
the second in region B. Because 2c > , which implies that the cost of migration is higher 
than the value of the rank improvement, this individual will stay in region A; 
for 3c >  (individuals n, 1n − , 2n − , and 3n −  are in region A), individual 4n −  can 
improve his rank by migration - from the fifth in region A to the first in region B. Thus, if 
3 4c< < , individual 4n −  will move to region B, and if 4c > , individual 4n −  will stay 
in region A. 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, the following generalization can be made: 
for 1c < , every second individual starting from individual 1n −  downwards (namely 
moving in the income hierarchy towards the “poorer” individuals) will be in region B, 
while the other individuals will be in region A; 
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for 1 2c< < , the two “richest” individuals (namely individual n and individual 1n − ) will 
be in region A, and every second individual starting from individual 2n −  downwards 
will be in region B, while the other individuals will be in region A;  
for 2 3c< < , the three “richest” individuals (namely individual n, individual 1n − , and 
individual 2n − ) will be in region A, and every second individual starting from 
individual 3n −  downwards will be in region B, while the other individuals will be in 
region A; 
and so on. 
Consequently, for 1k c k− < < , the k  “richest” individuals will be in region A, 
and every second individual starting from individual n k−  downwards will be in region 
B, while the other individuals will be in region A. It follows then that unless the 
population is particularly small, or unless the migration cost is extremely high, the 
obtained steady-state spatial distribution will be an approximately even division of the 
population between the two regions despite relaxation of the assumption of a zero cost of 
migration. 
 
4. SOCIAL WELFARE 
A particularly interesting question to pose is whether, from a social welfare point of view, 
the aggregate of the individuals’ migration responses to experiencing unfavorable income 
rank yields the optimal outcome. Taking a utilitarian stance, in the current setting where 
incomes are held constant, we naturally equate the maximal social welfare with the 
minimal sum of ranks. In constructing the social welfare function, we assign equal 
weights to the utilities of all the individuals. In turn, we assume that the individuals 
 17 
derive utility from income, and disutility from low rank. Given that the individuals’ 
incomes are held constant, social welfare is maximized when the sum of the individuals’ 
rank positions is minimized. We consider again the baseline setting in which each income 
level is held by one individual.  
Definition 1: Social welfare under rank preferences is the negative of the sum of the ranks 
of the individuals. 
For example, when two individuals with different incomes are in region A, then 
the sum of the first rank of one of them and of the second rank of the other is 1 2 3+ =  
rank positions; when the lower-ranked individual moves to empty region B, then the sum 
is 1 1 2+ =  rank positions. Social welfare in the latter case, at 2− , is higher than social 
welfare in the former case, at 3− .  
In general, when individuals pay no heed to the consequences of their actions for 
the wellbeing of others, we would not expect the aggregate of their behaviors to yield the 
social optimum. Not so in the current case, however. To see this, we put ourselves in the 
shoes of a social planner who seeks to distribute the individuals between the two regions 
in such a manner as to obtain the smallest sum of ranks.  
Claim 5: The objective of bringing social welfare under ordinal ranking to a maximum is 
achieved upon any allocation of the individuals in which they are distributed evenly (or 
evenly but for one) between the two regions.  
Proof: The proof is by contradiction.  
Assume that there are n individuals, where n is a natural number. Without loss of 
generality, we refer to a case of an even n. An analogous procedure to the one presented 
below can be conducted for an odd n, yielding qualitatively the same outcome. 
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Assume then that the individuals are distributed evenly between region A and 
region B. Then, social welfare, measured as per Definition 1, is  
( ) ( )
221 / 2 22 1 2 ... / 2 2
2 2 4 4
n nn n n nn
++ +
− ⋅ + + + = − ⋅ ⋅ = − = − . 
We let k individuals, where ( )1, 2, ..    /., 1 2nk = − , change their location. This 
means that there will be ( )/ 2n k+  individuals in one region, and ( )/ 2n k−  in the other 
region. Consequently, social welfare will be 
( ) ( ){ }
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where the inequality means that following this change in the distribution of the 
individuals between the two regions, social welfare is lowered. Q.E.D. 
This result is intriguing because although the individuals act of their own accord, 
they achieve the socially preferred outcome, as they are distributed equally or equally but 
for one individual between the two regions. This socially optimal distribution (of an even 
or of an even but for one divide) is reached in each of the steady-state outcomes reported 
in the settings of Claims 1-4.  
Will the result that the aggregate of the individuals’ behaviors yields the socially 
optimal outcome be obtained if the distress arising from falling behind others in the 
income hierarchy is measured in a cardinal manner rather than in a rank-based manner? 
The answer is no. In order to present the answer in a neat manner, we consider a specific 
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distribution of the incomes under which the socially optimal outcome is analytically 
tractable. 
Let the constellation of incomes of a population of n  individuals be given by 
1 2 nx xx < <…< . We express the distress that arises from falling behind others in the 
income hierarchy by means of the following cardinal measure of relative deprivation, 
where iRD  denotes the relative deprivation of individual i .    
Definition 2:  ( )
1
1 n
i k
k i
iRD x xn = +
≡ −∑  for 1,  2,  ...,  1i n= −  
 0nRD ≡ .  
A rationale, background, and applications of this measure are provided in Stark (2013). 
Under the constellation of incomes in which ix i=  (namely the income of individual i is 
i), we obtain the following simpler formulation of iRD .  
Definition 3:  ( )
1
1 n
i
k i
RD k i
n = +
≡ −∑  for 1,  2,  ...,  1i n= −   
 0nRD ≡ . 
As before, and to begin with, in period zero the n individuals are in region A. In 
the subsequent period all the individuals who experience relative deprivation and believe 
that they will experience none upon migrating to region B move to region B. Namely: 
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FIGURE 3. The steady-state spatial distribution of the population under cardinal 
preferences. 
 
Claim 6: Under cardinally-measured distaste for low relative income, the division in 
which n is in region A and the remainder of the population is in region B constitutes the 
spatial steady-state distribution.   
Proof: We consider individual k , where 1,  2,  ...,  1k n= − , who in period 1 weighs 
whether to stay in region B or whether to move back to region A. We refer to individual 
k’s relative deprivation as |k k BRD ∈  when he is in region B, and as |k k ARD ∈  when he is in 
region A. We have that  
( ) ( ) ( )|
1 11 2 ... 1
1 2 1k k B
n k n kRD k k k k n k
n n∈
− − −
= + − + + − + + − − = ⋅$ %& '− −
, 
and that  
| .2k k A
n kRD ∈
−
=  
Because 1 1
1
n k
n
− −
<
−
, individual k  will prefer to stay in region B. And because this holds 
for any 1,  2,  ...,  1k n= − , none of the 1n −  individuals in region B will have an incentive 
to migrate back to region A, nor will individual n who is not relatively deprived have an 
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incentive to migrate and, thus, the observed state, as depicted in Figure 3, is the spatial 
steady state. Q.E.D. 
Comment. The same result as the one reported in Claim 6, namely the result that 
the division in which n is in region A and the remainder of the population is in region B 
constitutes the spatial steady-state distribution, will be obtained when cardinal relative 
deprivation is measured as the distance from below the mean income, namely when 
Definition 2 is replaced by max{ ,0}i iRD x x≡ −  where x  is the average income in the 
region in which individual i is located, and Definition 3 is replaced by 
max{ ,0}iRD x i≡ − . The proof is in the Appendix. 
In the utilitarian setting, this steady-state distribution with individual n in region 
A, and all the other individuals in region B is not, however, the socially optimal outcome. 
The distribution that confers the highest level of social welfare requires the aggregate of 
the individuals’ levels of relative deprivation to be minimized, assuming, again, that in 
constructing the social welfare function an equal weight is assigned to each of the 
individuals. 
Definition 4: Social welfare under cardinal ranking is the negative of the sum of the 
levels of relative deprivation of the individuals.  
Claim 7: Social welfare under cardinal ranking is maximized when individuals 
1,  ...,  2,  1i i− −  are in one region, and individuals   ...,  1,  ,i n n−  are in the other region, 
where ( )/ 2 1i n= +  if n is even, or where ( )1 / 2i n= +  or ( )3 / 2i n= +  if n is odd.  
Proof: Because the proof is tedious, it is relegated to the Appendix.  
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As a consequence, when position in the income hierarchy is measured cardinally, 
there is a role for the social planner to interfere in order to achieve the socially preferred 
outcome.  
A reason for the difference between the nature of the social welfare outcomes 
obtained under the two types of preference seems to be that under rank preferences, the 
social optimum is much easier to obtain in the sense that only the numbers of the 
individuals in each of the regions matter, not the distributions of their incomes and, thus, 
there are many social optima, so achieving any is relatively easy. Under a cardinal 
measure of relative deprivation, however, there is only one global optimum and, thus, it is 
far more difficult to achieve that optimum without synchronizing the actions of the 
individuals. It is worth adding that the socially optimal outcome under “cardinal ranking” 
is also the socially optimal outcome under “ordinal ranking,” but only one out of the 
many socially optimal outcomes under “ordinal ranking” constitutes the socially optimal 
outcome under “cardinal ranking.”  
Clearly, the socially preferred outcome under “cardinal ranking” is not a steady- 
state spatial distribution (for example, using the notation of Claim 7, individual i has an 
incentive to move to the other region in order to decrease his relative deprivation). 
Therefore, the role of the social planner is not only to help achieve the welfare 
maximizing spatial configuration, but also to shield it from individual actions that are 
likely to go against the social interest. 
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5. COMPLEMENTARY CONSIDERATIONS 
An alternative measure of income rank: a negative result 
The rank measure that we have used throughout is “pure” in the sense that being placed 
second, say, in the income hierarchy is second, regardless of the size of the population. 
Consider rank as if it were a claim for a prize, and suppose that there are two prizes. 
Then, if an individual occupies the second rank he is awarded a prize, if he occupies a 
lower rank he is not awarded a prize. In terms of getting or not getting a prize, it is 
immaterial to the individual whether the field has, say, 3n =  or 3n >  individuals.  
Formally, if rank is made dependent on the size of the population such that 
holding a higher rank is preferable to a lower rank and having a given rank in a larger 
population is preferable to having the same rank in a smaller population, then the analysis 
presented in this paper will collapse; a steady state will not be reached. To see that, we 
take again the case of individuals whose incomes are 1 2 ... nx x x< < < , and we set n at 4. 
To begin with, let 4, 3, 2, and 1 be in region A. As before, individuals 3, 2, and 1 move to 
region B. But under the new interpretation of the rank preferences, 4 will want to be in 
region B (because being the first out of four is preferable to being the first out of one), so 
all the individuals will then be in region B. Now 3, 2, and 1 will prefer to be in region A, 
4 will prefer likewise, and so on. Thus, a steady state will not be reached. The same 
argument applies even if we net out the individual who holds the top rank, but endow the 
other individuals with a preference to hold a given rank when there are more individuals 
in their region. In such a case, the sequence of moves will be:  
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FIGURE 4. The sequence of migration moves of a population of four individuals that 
does not result in a steady-state spatial distribution under ordinal preferences. 
 
We see that the process repeats itself ad infinitum and a steady state is not reached.  
A re-interpretation of the cardinal measure of relative deprivation as a distance from a 
mean 
The relative deprivation index presented in (the first part of) Definition 2 can be rewritten 
in a slightly different form. Multiplying and dividing the index by n i− , we obtain:  
(1) ( )1
1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
n
k
i i
n
k i
k i i i
k i
x
n i x x n i x n i x x
n n i n n
RD
i n
= +
= +
!"
#$− & ' & '#$− = − − = − −( ) ( )− −* + , -, -
=
∑
∑ ,  
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where 
1
1
k
k
i
n
i
x x
n i = +
≡
− ∑  is the average income of the individuals whose incomes are 
higher than the income of individual i (these are the individuals who are positioned to the 
right of individual i, namely higher up, in the income distribution).  
A re-interpretation of the cardinal measure of relative deprivation as a composite index 
of a rank impact term and a cardinal impact term 
We can think of the most right hand side of (1) in a novel way, viewing iRD  as the 
product of a pure rank impact term ( )n i−  and a cardinal impact term ( )1 iix xn
! "−$ %& '
. For 
the case of Definition 3, we can write the two far ends of (1) as: 
( )1( )i n i j in
RD ! "− −$ %&
=
'
 
where j  is the average income of the individuals whose incomes are 1, 2,...,i i n+ + .  
The term n i−  expresses the rank distance of individual i from the top rank, 
where “distance” is measured by the number of ranks higher up. This is the measure used 
in the basic model and in the extensions of the model in Sections 2 and 3. Seen this way, 
the standard cardinal measure of relative deprivation has a pure rank preferences 
component imbedded in it, and a cardinal preferences component. This is revealing in the 
sense that the distress from trailing behind others can be decomposed into the distress 
from occupying a rank other than the top rank, measured by n i− , and the distress arising 
from a positive magnitude of the income differences between the higher incomes of 
others and one’s own income. An empirical cardinal preferences model of migration will 
be based on a utility representation that incorporates iRD  as displayed in (1), whereas an 
empirical ordinal preferences model of migration will be based on a utility representation 
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that incorporates only the n i−  term, as if definitionally setting the ( )1 i ix xn
−  part in (1) 
equal to one. This conceptual differentiation illustrates how the two migration models 
could be distinguished empirically. 
   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
There is considerable empirical evidence that, holding other considerations constant, 
lagging behind others in the income (or wealth) distribution prompts migration. In the 
received literature, the manner in which this trailing behind is measured is cardinal, and 
the social consequences of the migration response to this “bad” are typically not traced. 
Specifically, the existing research does not perform robustness checks on its conclusions 
by employing other measures that represent distress from falling behind others in the 
income hierarchy such as, for example, an income-based measure of rank. Thus, there is 
room, if not a need, for such an analysis. As already noted in the Introduction, models 
that employ ordinal rank may predict starkly different behavior from models employing 
cardinal rank (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2008), and there is no certainty as to which type 
of measure, ordinal or cardinal, adequately represents people’s preferences. An 
interesting possibility would be to revisit past empirical studies and re-estimate 
econometric models employing an ordinal measure of relative deprivation instead of the 
cardinal measure. The use of an ordinal measure, which brings into the regression less 
information about people’s position in the income distribution in relation to others, can 
lead to results that differ from those reported when relative deprivation is measured 
cardinally. Suppose that the income gap at origin increases, say from between 2y and y to 
between 3y and y, where y is a positive real number; that there are many individuals with 
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each of the two incomes; and that holding all else constant, this increase in the income 
gap is actually not observed to bring about an increase in the propensity to resort to 
migration by the low-income individuals. Concluding then that the individuals are not 
motivated to migrate by relative deprivation considerations, which could be correct if 
relative deprivation is sensed and measured cardinally, will be erroneous if relative 
deprivation is rank-based; the increase in the income gap leaves ranks intact and, thus, 
under rank-based references, we would not expect a change in migration behavior / the 
incentives to migrate. Put differently, holding the incomes of other individuals constant, a 
lowered rank for a given individual always implies an increase in the individual’s relative 
deprivation measured cardinally, but the converse is not true, namely an increase in the 
individual’s relative deprivation measured cardinally does not necessarily imply an 
increase in his rank-based relative deprivation.  
Our analysis supplements the received empirical migration inquiries in three 
ways. It models migration when preferences are rank-based, it works out the resulting 
spatial steady-state distribution, and it shows that the aggregate of the migration decisions 
of the individuals at the steady state sums up to a distribution that is optimal from a social 
welfare point of view.  
Of course a setting such as the one presented here, in which distaste for low rank 
motivates behavior that leads to the social optimum is not enough to explain why 
preferences for higher rank that have conveyed evolutionary advantages millennia back 
in time are still with us. But it adds a reason, if we maintain that higher social welfare and 
evolutionary edge are positively correlated.   
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APPENDIX 
Proof of the result reported in Claim 6 when cardinal relative deprivation is measured as 
distance from below the mean 
To begin with, in period zero the n individuals are in region A. In the subsequent period, 
all the individuals who are relatively deprived - in this case, the individuals whose 
incomes are lower than the average income in region A - will migrate to region B, while 
the other individuals will remain in region A. Thus, individuals , 1,...,n n m−  where 
1
2
nm = +  if n is even, and individuals , 1,...,n n m−  where 1
2
nm +=  if n is odd, will 
remain in region A, whereas individuals 1,...,2,1m−  will migrate to region B. But now 
the average income in region A becomes higher, so in the subsequent period the 
individuals whose income is below the average income of those remaining in region A 
become relatively deprived and they will, thus, be better off migrating to region B. This 
process will continue until only individual n remains in region A.  
We note that none of the individuals who have migrated to region B will find it 
attractive to return to region A even after the subsequent arrivals in region B of the higher 
income individuals. Thus, again, a spatial distribution such that individual n is in region 
A while individuals 1,2,.. ., 1n −  are in region B constitutes the steady-state spatial 
distribution. To see this, consider individual k , 1,2,..., 1k n= − . The average income in 
region B in the “alleged” steady-state distribution is 
2
n , and this is lower than 
2
n k+ , the 
average income that individual k  will experience if he were to return to region A. Thus, 
if 
2
nk ≥ , then individual k  does not have an incentive to migrate back to region A 
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because he is not relatively deprived in region B. And if 
2
k n< , namely if individual k is 
relatively deprived in region B, then his relative deprivation there is 
2
n k− , and this is 
lower than his relative deprivation will be in region A, which is 
2
n k k+ − . Hence, no 
further migration will occur. Q.E.D. 
In this case, reaching the spatial steady state will take 2 1log ( 1)n +−" #$ %  periods, 
where the symbol ! "x  denotes the biggest integer that is not greater than x. For example, 
when 9n = , the number of periods it takes to reach the steady state will be 
2 1 3 1 4.log (9 1) + = + =−" #$ %  Equivalently, we have that reaching the spatial steady state 
will take k  periods, where k  is an integer such that 12 2k kn− < ≤ , so that, for example, 
when 9n =  we have that 4k =  because then n is between 32 8=  and 42 16= . We next 
show the equivalence of these two formulas, namely the equivalence of 1k  and 2k  when 
1 112 2k kn− < ≤  and 2 2 1log ( 1)nk +−" #$ %= . 
Suppose that for 1n > , n +∈ , the numbers 1k  and 2k  are defined in the 
following manner: 
(1.) 1k  is an integer such that 1 112 2k kn− < ≤ ; 
(2.) 2 2 1log ( 1)nk +−" #$ %=  . 
We proceed in five steps. 
(i) We restate definition (1.) as follows: 1k  is an integer such that 1 112 1 2k kn− − <≤ . (This 
definition is equivalent to definition (1.) because 1 12k − , n , and 12k  are all integers, which 
follows from the assumption that 1n > .) 
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(ii) We look at definition (2.) and denote 2log ( 1)x n= − , which means that 2 1
x n= − . 
(iii) Because (from (i)) 1 112 1 2 2xk kn− =≤ − < , it has to be that 1 11k x k≤− < .   
(iv) By the definition of ! "⋅ , ! "x  is the biggest integer that is not larger than x . 
Therefore, from (iii) it follows that ! " 1 1kx = − .   
(v) Because 2log ( 1)n x− = , then it is also the case that ! "2( 1log )n x=−$ %! " . 
Thus, from (iv), (v), and the definition of 2k , we have that ! "1 1k x= +  
22 1( 1)log kn= + =−" #$ % . 
 
Proof of Claim 7 
In line with Definition 4, the maximum of social welfare under cardinal ranking is 
reached when total relative deprivation (TRD) is minimized, where TRD is the sum of the 
levels of relative deprivation experienced by the members of a given group, and relative 
deprivation is specified as in Definition 2. To find the division of a population of n 
individuals between region A and region B that confers the highest social welfare, we 
proceed in two steps. First, given the size of the groups in the two regions, we show that 
the minimum TRD is reached when high income individuals are in one of the regions, and 
low income individuals are in the other region. (That is, the minimum is reached when 
the income of any individual who is in one region is higher than the income of any 
individual who is in the other region.) Second, given such a distribution, we show that the 
minimum TRD is reached when half of the individuals (for an even n) or half of the 
individuals but for one (for an odd n) are in one region, with the remainder of the 
individuals in the other region. 
 31 
Lemma A1: Let n be a fixed positive integer. Consider an ordered vector ( )1 2, ,..., na a a  
where 1 2 ... na a a< < <  and the ia ’s are positive integers. Let 
1 2
1 1
, ,...( , )
n n
jn
k j
k aa aS a a
= =
= −∑∑ . Then 1 2, ,..., )( nS aa a  reaches its minimum if and only if 
1 1i ia a+ = +  for     1, 2, ..  ., 1 i n= − . 
Proof: Because the ia ’s are positive integers, for any , 1,  2, ...,  k j n= , we have that 
jk a ka j− ≥ −  with the minimal possible value of jka a− , namely k j− , obtained 
when 1
for 1,2,..., 1
1i
i n
iaa +
= −
" #
$ %
&
=
'
+ . Consequently, the sum 1 2, ,..., )( nS aa a  reaches its minimum if and 
only if 1 1i ia a+ = +  for 1,  2,  ...,  1i n= − . Q.E.D. 
Corollary A1: Consider an ordered vector of incomes ( )1,..., 1,n n− , where n is a positive 
integer. Let the incomes be distributed between the two regions such that an ordered 
vector of incomes in region A is 1 2( , ,..., )Ank k k , and an ordered vector of incomes in 
region B is 1 2( , ,..., )Bnj j j , where A Bn nn= + . The total  relative deprivation of the 
population is the sum of the levels of total relative deprivation experienced in each of the 
two regions, namely A BTRD TRD TRD+= . Then, if n, An , and Bn  are fixed, TRD reaches 
its minimum if and only if 1 2( , ,..., ) (1,2,... ),Bn Bj j j n=  or 1 2( , ,..., ) (1,2,... ),A Ank k k n= ; that 
is, if and only if 
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FIGURE A1. The TRD-minimizing spatial distribution of the population under cardinal 
preferences. 
 
Proof: We note that 1 2
( , ,..., )
2
An
A
A
S k k k
TRD
n
= , and that 1 2
( , ,..., )
2
B
B
n
B
S j j j
TRD
n
= , where the 
function ( )S ⋅  is as defined in Lemma A1. Thus, for fixed An  and Bn , minimizing ATRD  
is equivalent to minimizing 1 2( , ,..., )AnS k k k , and minimizing BTRD  is equivalent to 
minimizing 1 2( , ,..., ).BnS j j j  We denote the distribution of incomes between region A and 
region B that minimizes TRD by * * *1 2( , ,..., )Ank k k , 
* * *
1 2( , ,..., )Bnj j j .  
Without loss of generality, we assume that 2
* * *
1( , ,..., )Ann k k k∈ . The proof proceeds 
by contradiction. Assume that 2
* * *
1( , ,.. 1,..., )., ) (An Bn nk k k ≠ + . This means that 
2
* * *
1( , ,..., ) (1,..., )Bn Bj j j n≠ . Then, by Lemma A1, we have that 
*
2
* *
1( , ,. 1,.., .,. ). ) (An BS S nk k k n> + , which implies that 
* * *
1 2( , ,..., )AA nTRD k k k  
1 .., )( ,.A B nTRD n +> . By analogy, we obtain that 
* * *
1 2( , ,..., ) (1,..., )BnB B BTRD j j j TRD n> . 
Thus, * * * * * *121 2(( , ,..., ), ( , ,..., ))BAn nTRD k k k j j j 1,..., ),(( (1,..., ))B BTRD n nn> + , which 
 33 
contradicts the assumption that TRD reaches its minimum at * * *1 2( , ,..., )Ank k k , 
* * *
1 2( , ,..., )Bnj j j . Hence, the minimum is obtained when 2
* * *
1( , ,.. 1,..., )., ) (An Bn nk k k = +  and 
2
* * *
1( , ,..., ) (1,..., )Bn Bj j j n= .  
By a similar reasoning, it can be shown that when 2
* * *
1( , ,..., ) )(1,...,An Ak k k n≠  and 
2
* * *
1( , ,.. 1,..., )., ) (Bn An nj j j ≠ + , the minimum of TRD is not reached.  
In conclusion, TRD reaches its minimum at either of the two configurations 
exhibited in Figure A1. Q.E.D. 
Building on Corollary A1, we now consider the size of the two groups that brings 
TRD to a minimum. 
Let ( ,..., )n i  be in region A, and let ( 1,...,1)i −  be in region B. Then,  
1
           
        
...
1 1 2 1 20
1 1 1
1 (1 2) ... (1 2 ... )          =
   
1
( )( 2) .
6
A n n iTRD RD RD RD
n i
n i n i n i
n i
n i
n i n i
−= + + +
+ + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ −
= + + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+
− + − + − +
+ + + + + + + −
− −
− − +
=
  
We obtain this result as follows. We note that 
2
1 1 1 1
(1 ) 1 1 1 (1 ) 1 ( 1)(2 1)(1 2 ... )
2 2 2 2 2 2 6
( 1)( 2)                          .
6
n n n n
k k k k
k k n n n n nk k k
n n n
= = = =
+ + + +
+ + + = = + = +
+ +
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
Substituting n i−  for n in the last but one expression of ATRD  yields the last expression 
of ATRD . By a similar procedure we obtain that  
 34 
( )
1 2 1...
1 2 1 11 1 20
1 1 1
1 (1 2
          
          
) (1 2 ... 2)        
1
( 2) .
6
B i iTRD RD RD RD
i
i i i
i
i
i i
− −= + + +
+ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ − −+
= + + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+
− − −
+ + + + + + −
=
−
−
=
 
Therefore, (1/ 6)[( )( 2) ( 2)].A BTRD TRD TRD n i n i i i= + = − − + + −  We seek to solve 
1
min
i n
TRD
≤ ≤
. In order to find the minimum, we temporarily treat i as a continuous variable. 
(This treatment, as to be seen momentarily, does not affect the solution value.) Because 
/ (1/ 3)( 2 2)dTRD di n i= − + −  and 2 2/ (2 / 3) 0d TRD di = > , we have that the minimum 
of TRD is reached when / 0dTRD di = , namely when 2 2 0n i− + − = .  
Thus, for an even n, the i that brings TRD to a minimum is * ( / 2) 1i n= + , and the 
corresponding value of TRD is * 2(1/12)( 4)TRD n= − . For an odd n, a direct calculation 
yields that when ( 1) / 2i n= + , or when ( 3) / 2i n= + , then, in both cases, 
2(1/12)( 3)TRD n= − . Therefore, if n is an odd number, the i that brings TRD to a 
minimum is * ( 1) / 2i n= +  or * ( 3) / 2.i n= +  In sum, the sizes of the two groups that 
bring TRD to a minimum are the same or the same but for one. This completes the proof 
of Claim 7.  
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NOTES 
1. In earlier work reported in this journal (Stark et al., 2012), the dynamics of skill 
formation was shown to be linked with comparison group affiliation. Specifically, the 
acquisition of human capital was assumed to bring about a change of location in social 
space and revision of the comparison groups. Skill levels were viewed as occupational 
groups. Moving up the skill ladder by acquiring additional human capital, in itself 
rewarding, was shown to lead to a shift in the individual’s inclination to compare himself 
with a different, and on average better-paid, comparison group, in itself penalizing. 
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